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LEGAL ETHICS AFTER BABEL
THOMAS L. SHAFFER*
Legal ethics owes as much to Richard M. Nixon as it does to
philosophy. The rebirth of legal ethics in the last decade is one of
many consequences, although possibly the most obscure, of the
burglary at the Watergate Hotel in 1972. The criminal politics that
destroyed Mr. Nixon's presidency summoned American lawyers to
a serious, systematic examination of the morals of their craft.
. A distressing number of the Watergate villains, including the
President, were lawyers: Dean, Erlichman, Colson, Mitchell, and
McGruder. The bar association committees that tend professional
image were not consoled by the fact that many of the Watergate
heroes were also lawyers: Senator Sam Ervin, Representatives
Barbara Jordan and Caldwell Butler, Cox, St. Clair, and Judge
Sirica.
At about the time the Watergate lawyers were being paroled
from their relatively comfortable cells in minimum security
federal prisons, the American Bar Association established a
committee of eminent lawyers and law teachers to prepare a new
statement of legal ethics for the American legal profession. The
Association's accreditation standards for law schools had by then
been amended to require instruction in ethics as a condition for the
license to practice law. "Law Day" ceremonies for a few years
sounded less triumphant than they had in the glory days of the Cold
War. Speakers spoke less of the menaces of communism and more
of the home-grown menaces of hubris and greed. They asked, or
hinted at sympathy with those who asked, "What is the matter with
lawyers?"
The answer when it came was no more triumphant than the Law
Day speeches: there is nothing the matter with lawyers that is not
the matter with everybody else. The "problem" of the Watergate
lawyers was not their failure to be noble but that questions about
legal ethics assume that lawyers claim to be noble. This answer
(and I intentionally lapse here into the present tense) seems
calculated to make the question go away, as if the profession's
concern for morals had found its way out of Watergate.
* This is the first draft of a chapter in a book that is tentatively titled
LAWYERS AND THEIR COMMUNITIES and that will, if all goes well, be published
in 1991 by the State University of New York Press. It was presented at s
symposium on Legal Ethics at the Capital University Law and Graduate
Center, Columbus, Ohio on February 12, 1990.
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Calculated or not, the "lawyers-are-not-noble" answer has given
comfort to law students over the last. decade and it probably explains
why law professors no longer fuss over Watergate very much. By
and large, American lawyers in the making see no reason to be
morally distinct. The distinction they think lawyers should have is
in knowledge and craftsmanship, and that distinction is understood
to be technical, not moral. There is nothing new in this. It is the
way 19th century American lawyers came to terms with taking fees
from the Robber Barons. In both cases, skill at manipulating an
esoteric access to coercive power over-shadowed a "republican"
tradition of civic virtue.1
There is a remnant from Watergate as there was a remnant
from the Babylonian Captivity. Some hearts and some few minds
see possibilities in the two ethical propositions that are involved in a
post-Watergate assessment of legal ethics:
(i) there is nothing particularly wrong with
lawyers; they are still, as the old saw has it, good
people to drink with; few of them would steal your
wallet, but
(ii) lawyers should be persons of heightened moral
sensitivity (as elders in the profession often still
claim they are).
The realization that evil among the lawyers in the Nixon White
House was as banal as evil anywhere else did not entirely dampen
the speculative curiosity the Watergate lawyers raised. A remnant
keeps the curiosity alive and from the curiosity has come a revival
of legal ethics. The parent of legal ethics is the questions the
Watergate lawyers raised for the profession and an answer that
seemed calculated to cause the question to go away.
I do not claim, of course, that American lawyers were not
curious about their morals before 1973. Our popular American
lawyer stories are stories of moral lives in the profession:
Faulkner's Gavin Stevens is the protagonist through a generation of
stories of southern gentlemen; Harper Lee's "To Kill a
Mockingbird," published in 1960, is still better known to the average
American twenty-year-old than the Bible. Network television was,
before 1973, as it is now, never without its popular series of lawyer
stories. America is steadily interested in the morals of lawyers,
even though most lawyers were, before 1973, and are, and always
have been, indifferent to the quaint rhetoric that comes from the
study and teaching of academic ethics.
Nor do I mean to say that there was not, before Watergate, a
subject of study and practice called legal ethics. Since the early
1. I argued thus in The Unique, Novel, and Unsound Adversary Ethic, 41
VAND. L. REV. 697 (1988).
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nineteenth century, lawyers in America have had both a normative
tradition and a set of procedures for casting out the morally unfit.
At least since the middle of the 19th century the normative tradition
has been called legal ethics. It proved interesting to some, and led
to study, generalization, bits of teaching, and some slight sequential
discussion that was not about procedure nor about law. The
Philadelphia lawyer Henry Drinker was deservedly eminent for
his efforts to give intellectual substance to the profession's exclusion
procedures. In 1953, supported by a foundation grant, he published
the only treatise on legal ethics that was available when I was a law
student. He no doubt developed a speculative curiosity about what
made a person morally unfit to practice law.
There was thus a tradition of scholarship and discussion on the
morals of American lawyers, but it was a small and unimportant
thing. Drinker was the only lawyer thought to be an expert in the
subject. He was not employed by a university, and his work in legal
ethics was a part-time endeavor. No one I went to law school with
read Drinker. I, like most law students of the fifties and sixties,
was not given formal instruction in legal ethics, and was not
examined on the subject by either university or court. The extent of
my consideration even of the profession's regulatory tradition was
a required, handwritten paragraph on my application to be admitted
to the Indiana Bar. I was told to explain what the Code of
Professional Responsibility meant to me. I don't remember what I
wrote. I doubt that anyone read it.
Before Watergate, a few law schools offered elective courses in
which students could study appellate opinions in cases where
someone who had been denied admission to the profession pointed to
a legal argument against exclusion, or in which an ex-lawyer
claimed he had been thrown out unlawfully. Those casebooks
served as the ancestor of a different and now vigorously positivistic
discipline but it was not ethics. It was, until Watergate, a rationale
for sanctions that good lawyers imposed on bad lawyers. The
broader subject, as Henry Drinker presented it, conveyed
conventional notions of professional propriety and, in places, hinted
at moral aspiration but the moral aspiration was equally
conventional. It was what lawyers brought from home, family and
religious congregation. There was no evidence in Drinker's
discipline of a community of thinkers whose common concern was
to ask how a good person goes about being a lawyer, or a lawyer
goes about being a good person. Watergate brought a body of law on
lawyers into relief, as it gave us lawyer after lawyer who, faced
with the public fact that he had done something manifestly
disgusting, said, "I did not break the law." It seems to have become
necessary, after Watergate, to separate the law on lawyers from
legal ethics as ethics. I will use these two phrases as they would be
thus separated.
Most of the legal profession's effort in the last decade has been to
clarify and enforce the law on lawyers. I am interested in legal
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ethics, the lesser part of the separation. This is my fourth book as a
member of the ethical remnant:2 My concern is both with legal
ethics as it rose to the top of the Watergate swamp, and also with
what is left over from the continuation of the tradition and practice
(which Watergate made more prominent) of excluding bad people
from the profession and throwing scoundrels out.
Interest in consensus statements from lawyers about how
lawyers should behave begins, in America, so far as I can tell, in
1817, when the truculent Baltimore law teacher David Hoffman put
an appendix on lawyer "deportment," at the end of his celebrated
"course of law study." In 1836, Hoffman revised his "Course" and
expanded his appendix into a set of "Fifty Resolutions on
Professional Deportment." Half a century later, as lawyers were
being identified with the Robber Barons of the Industrial Revolution
(1870-1880), and began as a consequence to form bar associations, it
became routine for lawyers in association to express formal
agreement with statements such as Hoffman's. The statements
were academic pieces of work. They originated as instruction to law
students, who were not asked whether they agreed with what they
read or heard. Hoffman's "resolutions" were useful, but the more
popular source for proposed consensus was a set of lectures given in
1854 by the founding dean of the University of Pennsylvania Law
School, Judge George Sharswood.
Between 1880 and 1908 these academic statements, garnished
with adoption by local bar associations, were formulated into (or at
any rate called) codes. The most famous instance of codal
translation was the Alabama Code that Judge Thomas Goode Jones
worked out in the 1880s.3 In the twenty years after Judge Jones
finished the Alabama Code, his draft for the Alabama Bar was
adopted either as court rules by the supreme courts of several states,
or as statutes by state legislatures.4 The translation from statement
to code and from bar-association code to court rule or statute meant
that these statements had become sources of law.
The mainline twentieth century tradition with which the late Mr
Drinker is identified begins with the adoption by the American Bar
Association, in 1908, of the "Canons of Ethics," a model legal code
for courts and legislatures to follow. The aspiration was that the
A.B.A. model would become general and the system would therefore
2. The others are, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER (1980),
AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS (1985), and FAITH AND THE PROFESSIONS (1987).
3. Jones was not an academic; he was then a circuit judge, a Confederate
war hero who would become governor of Alabama and, later, United States
district judge.
4. In some cases they were adopted both as court rules and as statutes.
The British notion of the source of legal power to regulate lawyers is that
such authority is in the courts, whose officers lawyers are; but that notion has
been resisted by egalitarian American politics that would put the authority in
elected representatives of the people.
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become uniform. The tradition continued through half a century of
interpretation and amendment, much of it presided over by the
durable Mr. Drinker. It entered a period of revision in the post-war
(World War II) profession, producing the A.B.A.'s "Model Code of
Professional Responsibility" of 1970 (also a model for courts and
legislatures to adopt) and it reached its current definitive
expression when the A.B.A. adopted its new proposed "Rules of
Professional Conduct" in 1983. About half the states now follow the
1970 Code and half the 1983 Rules.
This is the "law-on-lawyers" tradition in America. It continues
now in a project of the American Law Institute to "re-state" the law
governing lawyers. When that project is approved by the majority
of those attending a meeting of the Institute, a by-invitation-only
organization of prominent judges, law teachers, and practitioners,
it will be to the law of lawyers what the Restatements of Torts,
Contracts, Property, and Trusts are to those parts of the law-school
curriculum-an influential generalization of the common law on
the coercive regulation of lawyer behavior.
The modern development that is relevant to my project, which I
trace to the Watergate Hotel in 1972, is the elimination of moral
aspiration from American lawyers' professional consensus. The
Canons of 1908, and their nineteenth-century antecedents, had
mixed morals and law because they were mixed in the minds of the
legal gentlemen who produced the Canons and their antecedents.
The 1970 Code retained both, but distinquished them. The coercive
part of the Code, called "disciplinary rules," was graphically
separate and printed in bold type. However, before the reader
reached the bold type, the Code presented, on each of nine broad
statements on lawyer behavior, a consensus statement of moral
aspirations called "ethical considerations. '
The 1983 proposed Rules eliminated the ethical considerations,
as it eliminated traditional words of moral assertion, e.g., right,
wrong, good, bad, conscience, and character. In its place are words
of etiquette and regulation, e.g., proper, permitted, indicative verbs
of description rather than conditional or imperative verbs of moral
duty. In the basic text of the rules, "shall" was substituted for
"should," as if the rules were the words of a statute. The 1983 project
replaced, in its proposed title, "Rules" for "Code" and "Conduct" for
"Responsibility." It declared independence from legal ethics. It
left, for those who want to bother with it, space to develop legal ethics.
Removed from its tradition, what the law on lawyers is is now
the work of a small sub-fraternity of law teachers of which I am a
member. In the early seventies, my law school (The University of
Notre Dame) instituted a new course for beginning students in
legal ethics. My colleague Fernand Dutile and I were assigned to
5. Except in Virginia, where the bold type came first and in Maine, where
the ethical considerations were not adopted at all.
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teach the new course. I brought to the task ten years of teaching wills
and trusts and some recent adventures in legal interviewing and
counseling. Dutile was, and is, a criminal-law teacher who also
works, writes, edits, and teaches on the law of education. We found
a couple of casebooks regarding the law on lawyers and appellate
opinions in admission and exclusion cases for teaching material,
which is the path of least resistance when one is assigned to teach a
course on this body of law.
I also found some fragmentary information, and nutured a
vague hope, that there were law teachers who were interested in
ethics in the way Socrates (or even Moses) was.' Dutile and I taught
for a couple of years out of the casebooks and a problem book by
Dean Norman Redlich. In a festschrift for Louis M. Brown, I wrote
an article called "Christian Theories of Professional
Responsibility." It was a clumsy essay, but it was the first of its
kind. Most of my friends in the law-teaching fraternity accepted it
politely, as if I had compared the Internal Revenue Code to the Book
of Revelation. A few kindred spirits read my essay, and some of
those thought it was interesting. I began to get concrete information
from them about law teachers becoming teachers of ethics.'
Thus, in the last half generation, university law schools have
seen the growth and even early signs of the maturity of an
academic sub-discipline and a fraternity whose principal interest
in teaching, scholarship, and practice (one, two, or all three) is
legal ethics, meaning ethics. It is a curious fraternity. It includes
Rhode, Martyn, and Maute. Members of it are people (i) with one
leg shorter than the other; (ii) climbing the Tower of Babel; (iii) who
suspect that they belong somewhere else.
Legs. Legal ethicists are not like their counterparts in medical
schools or divinity schools. Few teachers and scholars of medical
ethics are physicians but almost all legal ethicists are lawyers.
Those who "do" medical ethics are philosophers and theologians,
scholars who have given extensive, disciplined attention to the
deepest and oldest sources of moral thought, such as Hauerwas,
McCormick, Beauchamp, Childress, May, Gerald Dworkin, et al.
Few legal ethicists are formally trained in philosophy or theology.
Most are, as I am, academic lawyers who seem to have given up
reading law. We read philosophy and theology, novels,
anthropology, and humanistic social science. When we talk and
write, we depend on and exploit those who write what we read.
6. These, I hasten to interject, are not the same thing: Socrates inquired.
Moses, who was hit over the head by God, got the answer to a question he
had not asked.
7. My clumsy essay for Lou Brown was published in the same year as
Monroe Freedman's book, LEGAL ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM, a
provocative and influential set of arguments that, more than anything so far,
has set the terms of debate in American legal ethics.
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We are lawyers, though. We have gone through the black-box
process, in law school, and, usually, in law practice, that elders in
our profession refer to as "paying your dues." We have been to boot
camp. Many of us have actually had to think about supporting our
families with fees from clients. We are in a better position with
respect to the morals of law practice than most scholars and teachers
in medical ethics are with respect to the morals of practicing
medicine. As professional colleages, we can demand attention
from former students and practitioners. Medical ethicists can
rarely do that. They figuratively, and often enough literally, walk
last in the procession of white-coated people that make rounds in the
teaching hospital.
Medical ethicists, however, have more confidence than we do
when they write and talk about traditions of thought that support
ethics as an academic discipline. They have paid their dues in the
fraternities of the humanities, as graduate students, teaching
assistants, and learners of language and of argot. Many of them
have been in the clergy and have therefore endured the labyrinthine
hierarchy and cruel bureaucracy maintained, since the days of
King Solomon, by the Children of God. Most of them have also been
tortured by an academic tenure process that is uglier and cruder
than the ones we have in professional schools. In a way, this is
analogous to our black-box conversion to "thinking like a lawyer."
Scholars in medical ethics have gained a confidence in the use of
ethical literature that is, I suppose, akin to the confidence we
American lawyers have with our arcane common law case method.
Students of legal ethics lack confidence in ethics. We have to gain
confidence in the traditions of academic ethics, if we ever do,
uncertainly and dependently. We bluff alot, but in fact, with each
of us, one leg is shorter than the other.
Babel. I manipulated the title for this chapter from Jeffrey
Stout's book Ethics After Babel. Stout's book was a response to
Alasdair MacIntyre's. "After Virtue." Both are parts of a
conversation among students of ethics that includes the five authors
of "Habits of the Heart." These three recent, impressive, and
apparently influential books on ethics enjoy a wide readership
among academics, including law teachers who teach jurisprudence
and public law. They, and the conversations they provoked, describe
what we lawyers found when we first proposed to be serious about
ethics and to exploit our colleagues in the humanities.
We found chaos, disarray and a stately argument over whether
the chaos and disarray could again become useful. I say "again,"
because one thing those in academic ethics seem to agree about is
that there was a past in which academic ethics was useful. They do
not agree about when or on what sources in the past were useful. I
said "stately argument" because the chaos and disarray don't
alarm the debaters. They are less passionate abut the mess their
discipline is in than we lawyers are likely to be about our messes.
They seem to have less at stake than we do. I think that is because
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their discipline is practiced on a Tower of Babel and we don't want
ours to be.
In a sequel to After Virtue, MacIntyre -states, "[m]odern
academic philosophy turns out by and large to provide means for a
more accurate and informed definition of disagreement rather than
for progress toward its resolution . . . [Philosophers] succeed in
articulating the rival standpoints with greater clarity, greater
fluency, and a wider range of arguments than do most others, but . .
. little more than this." Stout is less grim, but that is because he
expects less from his colleagues. He argues that progress toward
resolution is possible without the conceptual agreement MacIntyre
cannot find. Stout does not argue that there is progress toward
resolution. The authors of Habits of the Heart report significant
moral consensus in America. They also found significant survival
of the moral traditions of community and of biblical faith that
Alexis deToqueville noticed in David Hoffman's America, but they
report that the students of ethics have failed to create a common
language. Consequently, academic lawyers don't know how to talk
to one another about moral questions or how to introduce our
students to their ethical heritage.
Acedemic ethics did not give the guidance we, of the remnant
from Watergate, has hoped to find. What we found is that legal
ethics has to formulate for itself what the pioneers might have hoped
to find in academic ethics. We have to define our ethical questions
as much as other legal scholars have to formulate contemporary
questions about the law of property or the function of the fault
doctrine in torts. We can exploit the students of ethics in
philosophy, theology and the humanistic social sciences, but we have
to do it in the way we exploit judges: We couldn't get along without
them; if we didn't have them, we would have to invent them; but they
will not hand us anything that is ready to wear. If we do wear what
they hand us, what we wear will not fit.
We Belong Somewhere Else. The promise of moral philosophy is
that it will give us a language that we can use to talk to one another
about morals. Moral philosophy fails us entirely if we find that its
language does not communicate. It fails us significantly when,
although we find that we can communicate with its language, we
cannot talk about what is deeply important in our moral lives
because it only gives us a set of lowest common denominators
instead of what Socrates gave the youth of Athens. MacIntyre
argues that moral philosophy has failed in the first way. Words
such as "justice" and "reason" do not mean the same thing to a
lecturer in philosophy as they do to her students. The language of
liberal democracy, which is the language of American legal
education, fails in the second way. We, as lawyers, are able to sit
down with our students and talk about "rights" in the law, but such
rights language in the law is purposely shallow so that it can serve
a legal order that claims to be value free.
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When the lawyer who teaches legal ethics (he of the uneven
legs) moves discourse from law to morals, and retains the language
of rights, what he has to say, if it communicates anything at all, is
trivial; a value-free moral system is not interesting. Rights
language' in legal ethics may also be wrong, but before that issue is
even considered it is trivial. When I attempt to contribute to such
conversations I feel trivial, when I listen to them I feel that I belong
somewhere else. My purpose is to suggest what "where we belong"
looks like.
Socrates went around Athens telling law teachers and law
students that their highest concern should be to be good people. He
said their next and consequent concern should be to show the
citizens of Athens how to be good people. For Socrates, as for
virtually all of the giants of classical moral philosophy and much
of Hebraic8 moral theology, ethical discussion is discussion about
being good persons and helping others to be good persons. When
we speak of Aristotle's "man of practical wisdom," literature's
heroes, religion's saints, paragons, role models, professional
exemplars, Francis of Assisi, Atticus Finch, or Leland McKenzie, it
is the good person we are talking about. The ethical speculation that
supports such moral talk is founded in disciplined curiosity about
the good person. This is the way classical moral philosophy
informed those who proposed to teach the young. It was the context
for Socrates's admonition to law teachers. Moral philosophy showed
teachers how to hold up the good person as a coherent object of
admiration, a coherent source of moral standards, a scheme for the
moral formation of young people and especially, in the citation to
Socrates I mention now, apprentice lawyers. Goodness among
apprentices who would soon be lawyers was, in Socrates's
argument, a goal in itself. Virtue and good character are goals in
themselves. Moreover, as Socrates applied the idea to the lawyers of
Athens it also became a means to a civic goal, the goodness of the
clients of lawyers.
If I trace that argument into the modern division of what was
once called legal ethics in America, into the law on lawyers and
legal ethics as ethics, I won't find evidence of Socratic influence
anywhere. It is not in the law on lawyers, nor in revived, post-
Watergate legal ethics. It is a novel proposition, believe it or not, to
say that if we want communities of good people we need lawyers
who are good people. In moral discourse, as in political and legal
discourse, we don't talk about good people, we talk about rights. The
assumption in discussions of rights, in politics, law, or ethics, is
8. I use "Hebraic" instead of "Judeo-Christian" to make and retain the
argument that Jews and Christians have a single tradition in ethics.
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that what citizens want for one another, or lawyers for their clients,
is not goodness but isolation and independence. The assumption in
the law on lawyers is that behavioral influence runs, not as.
Socrates thought, from lawyers to clients, but in the other direction,
and that influence is bad. It corrupts lawyers. Clients want
lawyers to do wrong actions and many lawyers today obey their
clients and do wrong for them. That's why, in 1983, we got a new
beginning for the law on lawyers. The law of lawyers is concerned
with whether lawyers are to refuse to do the wrong actions clients
want them to do. In this way, the law on lawyers evades concern for
the goodness of clients. It treats clients as threats to the moral
isolation and independence of lawyers. The result is that the
substance of the law on lawyers says it is enough that lawyers
require clients to obey the law.
Those who labor in legal ethics as ethics use the language of
rights in ethics and accept the liberal premise that what makes a
moral rule binding is that the moral actor chose it. Most of post-
Watergate legal ethics focuses as much on rights as the law on
lawyers does, and that means that legal ethics is act centered, rather
than person centered.
Rights language became the principal language of legal ethics
out of habit. When the remnant of Watergate established legal
ethics in the minds and mouths-of law teachers, our habitual liberal
discourse was in place in our law courses and our legal
scholarship. We naturally began to use it as a way to talk about
moral questions. Most of us went right on talking about rights,
which means we talk about facts instead of about people. I think this
has been a mistake. It has been a mistake for us to write, study,
and teach about the acts of abstract, depersonalized, inevitably male
lawyers. It has been a mistake for us to ask whether certain
hypothetical actions are right or wrong and to neglect to ask about
the people who perform the acts. It has been a mistake for us to
think of people as if they had no personalities and then to discuss
them as we learned to discuss landowners in the law of property; "A
conveys Blackacre to B who leases to C."
This mistake, fostered by the use of the language of rights in the
law, has led to other mistakes. If the act, rather than the person, is
raw material for ethical discussion, we are required by logic to
concentrate on the choices the actor makes. An act is the product of
a choice. It will be useless to talk about morals unless we talk about
the psychic process that produces acts. Ethics assumes we have
control of our moral lives. Control of a moral life that is made up of
acts is expressed in terms of choices.
If thinking about acts leads to thinking about choices then we
have to think about the issues that lead us to choices. We think
about issues, rather than about lives and persons and cultures. An
issue, in law or in ethics, is a set of facts presented to a choosing
psyche in the way a casebook legal issue is a set of facts presented to
an appellate judge. In ethics, choices are what emerge from these
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issues, problems, puzzles, quandaries, or, as it is most usually put
among lawyers and judges, "ethical dilemmas." So common is the
presentation of the dilemma as a device for discussion in our
subject that the phrase "ethical dilemma" is spoken as if it were one
word. Consideration of persons lives and cultures proceeds
differently, as I hope I can show. The fundamental difference is
anthropological in that, deep down, a person is not just a chooser.
There are things about persons, termed moral agents by moral
philosophy, that are more interesting than the choices they make, or
the sum of all the choices they have made.9
Act-based ethics turns on the significance of quandaries, but it
has shown less interest than you might expect in how quandaries
come about. That is why discussions of rights in ethics seem
shallow and are usually trivial. It is probably why the contents of
journals such as "Ethics" are arcane to the eyes and ears of
lawyers. Moral philosophers know, as much as teachers of future
interests do, that the way to keep hold of a trivial subject is to make
it complicated. What would be interesting in these discussions of
acts is to locate what it is that makes one person see a moral
quandary where another person would see something else, but
teachers of "act" ethics leave that question to the poets.
"Crimes and Misdemeanors," Woody Allen's latest and most
curious film about guilt, large and small, shows what I mean. It is
a story about film-makers. An old philosopher fascinates the less
confident of two film makers, played, of course, by Mr. Allen. The
film maker takes the unpromising course of shooting thousands of
feet of film of the old philosopher talking into a camera. The old
philosopher is based, I suppose, on the late Primmo Levi. Like Levi,
he finally commits suicide. The maker of the film within the film
then goes back to look at the thousands of feet of film he has of the
old philosopher speaking his wisdom into the camera. The film
maker wants, perhaps, to see if he can savage anything for
commerce, but probably he just wants to see if he can understand
why what struck him as marketable moral wisdom ended up in self
destruction.
In the filmaker's attempt to explain the suicide, or perhaps just
to show the senselessness of it, he discovers the clip where the old
philosopher states that human beings are defined by their choices.
We are choosers. What we has turn out to be is the sum total of our
own choices. I found these remarks amazing in context, so I took
the first opportunity to talk to one of my friends about it. My friend
said he thought the old philosopher's observation fit the rest of the
9. I am helped here by Baruch Bush's summary of the argument in
political theory among liberal isolation, social welfarism, and communitarian
jurisprudence, in Between Two Worlds: The Shift from Individual to Group
Responsibility in the Law of Causation of Injury, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1473,
1532-1542 (1986).
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story in Allen's film, the physician's choosing to murder his
mistress, other choices of infidelity to spouses, as it seemed to fit the
philosopher's choosing to murder himself.
My friend may be right. I don't think so. If he is right, the
fitting drips with irony. The physician, an ophthalmologist, has
murdered his mistress and he is tortured by guilt. He is tortured,
rather than merely fearful of being found out, because he is a Jew. I
don't mean that you have to be a Jew to feel guilty for murder, but
that this person feels guilty as a Jew would feel guilty. He feels
guilty because he is a Jew. We know from Philip Roth and Bruce
Jay Friedman and "Bye Bye Birdie" that there is something unique
about Jewish guilt. Jewish guilt is a recurrent theme in Woody
Allen's films, although this is the first time he tells a story about it
that doesn't make you laugh.
The tortured physician suffers when he cannot sleep at night or
pay attention to his patients during the day. Even his ultimate
formulation that the murder was a fateful choice as if he were
Adam in the Garden, are products of his growing up in an
observant and pious home, of hours and hours spent in the
synagogue and reading the Torah. The old philosopher says of us
human beings that each of us is the sum of his choices, but the
doctor did not choose to be a Jew. What is special, and therefore
interesting, is that his guilt is not something he chose.
The last scene in the movie shows the doctor in improving
emotional shape. He is still bothered by guilt, a little bit all the time
and occasionally a lot, but he is getting by. He reveals this in a
one-on-one conversation with the hapless film maker, in a corner,
during a Jewish wedding in the Waldorf Astoria Hotel. If the doctor
has figured out a way to live with his guilt, his way is the way of
Jews in America who can finance weddings and bar mitzvahs at
the Waldorf, who want more to be prosperous Americans with
Father-Knows-Best families in the suburbs than they want to be
Jews. The old philosopher would say that who the doctor is, there in
the quiet corner in the Waldorf, is the sum of his choices, but the
doctor did not choose to be a Jew in America.
The wedding also gives us the film's most touching scene. The
father of the bride is a rabbi who has gone blind. He dances with
his beautiful daughter, the two of them alone in the middle of the
dance floor. The rabbi is an exemplar of courage. He is a modern
man trying to understand and interpret both fate and the Torah to
himself and others. He is also a blind man who loves his daughter.
He did not choose to be a Jew, any more than the physician did. I
suppose one could say that, in a sense, the rabbi has chosen to be a
Jew and the physician, in murdering his mistress, has chosen not to
be a Jew, but that argument would be false. If the doctor has chosen
not to be a Jew, his choice is no comfort to him when he wakes up in
the middle of the night, tortured by guilt, Jewish guilt, for what he
has done. If he has chosen not to be a Jew, what is he doing at the
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wedding of the rabbi's daughter? What is he doing in a Jewish
family?
The rabbi did not choose to be blind. His daughter did not choose
to be a Jew or to have a father who would be such a good man, and
who would go blind. The irony in Woody Allen's film is the irony
of the old philosopher saying we are choosers when the language of
choice explains so poorly the important things about the people in the
film.
I think Woody Allen saw the irony and set out to show it in his
film. If he didn't, the irony was an inevitable consequence of his
act. A storyteller cannot do anything with choosers. A poet cannot
write poems about people described in theories of rights, or by the old
professor in "Crimes and Misdemeanors." A movie about choosers
would be unmarketable, which is why the film-maker in this story
is so hapless. The old professor professed act ethics, and act ethics
needs hypothetical people who are described without personalities or
relationships. They must be fungible, interchangeable people. Act
ethics could not explain to the blind rabbi why he should give his
daughter a wedding in the Waldorf. The old professor's ethic
cannot explain why he killed himself. It would be necessary to get
into his life and the lives of people he loved and lost and those who
loved and lost him, if you want an answer to that question
Act ethics needs people who can be described without
relationships or, at least, without the earthy things about
relationships that would interest a poet. The dogma in act ethics is
that the individual should choose his own morals. He shouldn't get
them from someone else, as the doctor and the rabbi did; as we all
do. What gives authority to morals in our lives, according to act
ethics, is that we have chosen them. If each of us should choose his
own morals, ethics would have to be careful not to describe each of
us as significantly related to other people. If my relationships are
potent, then my choices might not be my own. Act ethics .thus
describes excellence in terms of separation. Each of us is a self-
ruling, free chooser. In those attributes lie our excellence, and so
act ethics treats each person as being alone, a choosing machine
that runs itself. What I am suggesting, of course, is that it is useful
.in legal ethics to focus on the good person, on people rather than acts
and on good and bad rather than right and wrong. Focus on the good
person will imply a prominence for relationships in ethics. Putting
people back together again, or, rather, putting people back into
ethical theory, will make us notice that we people are connected to
one another, connected radically ( i.e. at the roots). We belong. It is
not that we belong because of our choices, but that we make the
choices we do because we are connected to other people. We belong
before we make choices. We make the choices we make because we
belong.
I mean to argue here, as Saul Bellow's Augie March did, that
first you are, and then you can, if you want to, choose to be what you
are, that this is the human condition. We are primarily members,
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not choosers. We are primarily connected, not alone. "All the
influences were lined up waiting for me," Augie said. "I was born,
and there they were to form me, which is why I tell you more of
them than of myself." Augie was a poor Jewish boy' ° of my
generation and he spoke of growing up in Chicago. He said: "I
know I longed very much, but I didn't understand for what . . .
[f]riends, human pals, men and brethren, there is no brief, digest,
or shorthand way to say where it leads. Crusoe, alone with nature,
under heaven, had a busy, complicated time of it with the inhuman
itself, and I am in a crowd that yields results with more difficulty
and reluctance and am part of it myself."
Legal education, more than any other kind of professional or
graduate education, places high value on discussion in large
classes. The term discussion is used because of its claim to be
"Socratic," and large classes because they are essential to the
economics of the enterprise. When I taught legal ethics with
dilemmas, twenty years ago, I found that discussion needs different
premises in ethics than it has always had in law. In legal
discussion there is an analytical discipline involved that we call
"thinking like a lawyer," but that involves intuition on the
imposition of coercive power. Closure in an ethical discussion
depends on persuasion and insight, where closure in a discussion
about law depends on force. This is true because someone has to be
persuaded in the law, but unless the person persuaded is the person
who can invoke coercion, the legal discussion is not closed.
Those who teach in the remnant of Watergate are not satisfied to
close off discussion of legal ethics by invoking the law on lawyers.
Consequently, discussion in legal ethics classes will be discussion
governed by insight and persuasion. My first method for this,
using "ethical dilemma quandaries," was to seek expressions of
opinion. I used, for example, a situation that was part of my own
limited law practice in those days, the draft-eligible young man who
wondered if he should emigrate to Canada. In one such case, my
client had sought and been denied conscientious-objector status from
his local draft board and there was no promising avenue of appeal.
The basis for his objection was that he believed his country's
military adventure in Southeast Asia was an unjust war, and
according to his traditional Roman Catholic beliefs, he could not
fight in that war. He did not object to all war. His belief in
"selective objection," about which he had, unfortunately, been
10. I suspect it is no accident that the examples that came to my mind,
from Woody Allen's film and Bellow's novel, have come from Jewish
storytellers telling about Jews in America, even though I am not Jewish and
have no connection with Jewish culture except through friends I made in
adulthood and the fact that I am a Christian. It is important to Jews in
America to hold on to a sense of themselves as a people. Jews are better at it
than any other group I can think of.
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candid when he talked to his draft board, is not provided for in
American law. His choices were to be inducted for combat duty or to
become a fugitive from the Selective Service system. He wondered
what he should do, so he asked his lawyer. His lawyer's quandary
was between advice to disobey the law and advice that would save
the client's conscience with the least likely pain to the client.
In the classroom, Student A raises her hand and says she would
never advise a client to disobey the law, that such professional
behavior would be like a physician advising suicide. My client, she
says, has no right to disobey the law and so I have no right to tell
him to disobey the law. Student B raises his hand and says, "Why
not? He got a raw deal. How is it that a Quaker, who objects to all
war, has a right to conscientious objection, but a Catholic, who
opposes unjust war, does not?"
Student C raises his hand and says my client is confronted with
a summons to limited martyrdom. The basis for this assertion was
that judges in the United States sent evaders such as my client to
federal prison for five years. The martyrdom, if that's what it was,
was limited. Our law did not provide for capital punishment as did
the law of Nazi Germany. With answers from D, E, and F to add to
these three, I would have, in about fifteen minutes, produced an
array of reactions to the dilemma. With a bit of pressing to clarify
positions, I satisfied what I at first thought to be a sufficient
"Socratic" agenda for a large class of law students talking about
legal ethics as ethics.
The implications of my procedures were that legal ethics is a
matter of choice. Once our hypothetical lawyer manages to keep
herself out of trouble using the the law on lawyers, what she does to
herself and her client with her professional power and skill
depends on what she chooses to do. What makes her choice moral is
that she chooses it. My legal-ethics classroom, with a lot of help
from voluble students, produced a moral smorgasbord from which
students could select what struck them as the moral thing to do.
What was selected would take its moral authority from the fact that
it was selected. Persuasion and insight were not ruled out, but I
hardly ever saw anyone who looked like he was being persuaded,
and what students said seemed less like insight and more like what
people say when they explain why they order a particular brand of
beer.
I grew out of that way of teaching legal ethics by depending, as I
always do, on scholars in academic ethics. I drew mainly from
Stanley Hauerwas, who declared war on democratic-liberal ethics
and politics, at about the time I started thinking that I was not doing
a very good job with my legal-ethics classes. The vestige of insight
I remember most prominently from those days, though, came not
from Hauerwas but from Christina Hoff Sommers, who teaches
philosophy to undergraduates and who inveighed, in The American
Scholar, against "ethics without virtue." Her argument is that the
sort of ethics teaching I was doing undermines common sense: "In
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a term paper .. . one of my students wrote that Jonathan Swift's
'modest proposal' . . . was 'good for Swift's society, but not for
ours."'
11
"[O]ne comes up against a grotesquely distorted perspective that
common sense has little power to set right," Sommers said. "When
a sophomore was asked whether she saw Nagasaki as the moral
equivalent of a traffic accident, she replied, 'From a moral point of
view, yes."' Sommers thought that the ethics she saw reflected in
these student responses demonstrated that the students lacked the
mental equipment to make a negative moral judgment on their
own, or anyone's, behavior."
Sommers' principle concern as a teacher of ethics was that her
students' responses to moral questions indicated no sense of culture,
no sense of where they had come from or of the community for
which they were being prepared. That concern seemed right and it
seemed to suggest an approach for large class discussion. I needed
to dig deeper. When Student A said a lawyer cannot advise clients
to disobey the law, I needed to find out where in her personality and
her life that answer came from. When student C talked of my
client's martyrdom to a Protestant jurisprudence of conscientious
objection, I needed to find out if the source of his point really was
his reading Jacques Maritain in college, or maybe he liked
Maritain because of something that was older and deeper than
college.
Anthropologist Carol Greenhouse, in her recent study of how
Baptists in Georgia do justice, and I, in later attempts to get ethical
discussion going in large classes of law students, both discovered
something about the way people work when they think about morals.
As nearly as I can tell, we discovered the same thing, although my
discovery was the result of halting classroom experiments, and hers
was scientific and supported by a foundation grant. The discovery
is that people show what their morals are by claiming where they
come from. Ethics is accounting for where you belong.
Greenhouse studied how members of a Baptist congregation in a
suburb of Atlanta deal with their disputes. Hers was a study of
justice and of the home life of those who do justice. Her premise or,
to describe it as it seems to have happened, her conclusion, or
discovery, is that people tend to explain their morals by claiming
11. Swift proposed that the way to solve the problem of hunger in
Ireland was for the Irish to eat their children.
12. Years later I thought of Sommers when I read a "singles" column in
our newspaper. The columnist had conducted a survey in which she found
that women who have affairs with married men prefer that wives not know
about the affairs. They preferred that the wives be deceived. The columnist
(Susan Deitz) said, "Obviously the sense of keen competition between rival
females was a strong element in the allure of a married lover." Maybe she
believes that sexual love is a jungle; maybe she cannot notice a moral
judgment when she sees one.
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membership in a moral community such as a family, an ethnic
group, a region of the country, or, in the case of her Baptists, a local
religious denomination. We account for ourselves morally by
naming what we belong to. I found the same sort of thing when I
started pressing law students a bit about what seemed to be their
moral choices. When I pressed Student A about this, and would not
let her get away with shrugging her shoulders and saying, "That's
how I feel," she would add, "I feel that way because I am a
Presbyterian."
Student B, when I pressed him to see if I could understand how
he explained his reaction the other way, when I was lucky said, "I
was brought up to believe that an unjust law is no law at all."
Really? Is that "principle" something he learned at his mother's
knee? Well, no, it isn't. He learned the principle in college, from a
political science teacher he liked. The principle he remembers is
one he learned relatively late in his young life. It expresses
something he thinks, but it really, now that he thinks about it, does
not explain why he thinks as he does. When he thinks about
explanation, the reaction of Student B resembles what his
immigrant Calabrian grandfather felt about killing people for the
Italian state. When I am lucky, Student B will mention to me after
class, or a month later, or ten years later, that the discussion led to
his deciding that he felt as he did about the draft board because he is
an Italian American. He had figured out where he came from.
Greenhouse argues, as an anthropologist, that the critical feature
in an explanation of behavior is that the explainer claims to be in a
community. His accounting for himself as a moral person is a
claim of membership. He explains himself by telling you where he
belongs. He comes up with one explanation rather than another,
"and thereby identifies with one group over another." Ours, as
deToqueville said, is "a society built not on obedience," not, that is,
on principles such as the one Student B came up with at first, not on
choice, "but on participation."
Greenhouse did not claim that this process of explanation was as
evident and handy as how one of her Southern Baptists might have
explained his aversion to tobacco or dancing. Often the realization
that I react as I do to a moral question because of where I belong,
marks the end of, or at least a stopping place in, a search.
Greenhouse asked one of her Georgia Baptists why he did not stand
up for himself in a family quarrel. He does not say at first that it is
because he is a Baptist. He quoted a principle or a bit of scripture, or
identified a habit he noticed in himself. It is only after he talks a
bit, and Greenhouse helps him along, that he realizes and says that
his explanation is membership. He feels as he does about being
assertive in quarrels because he is a Baptist. Both the inquiry,
which in an ethics class would have been stated as a quandary, and
the moral explanation relate to a "we" feeling, a feeling this person
gets when he looks to the left and to the right and says to himself, "I
am one of those. When I speak of 'those', I can say 'we."' It is not
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that he belongs because he made the right choice, but that he is right
because he belongs.
Ethnic membership as a way to understand morals often lies at
the end of a search. The first-person accounts I use later often read
like exercises in personal discovery. The moment of discovery,
however, is not at all like the moment of choice Sommers noticed
and decried as "half-baked relativism." Michael Novak, focusing
on the ethics of the late immigrants to America, explained that their
saying 'we" in this way is not a choice so much as it is a return, not
joining so much as noticing where I am, and what I am, and
thereby gaining an understanding of my moral self.
I may even say, "I have come home." The event I might have
called a quandary or, in law school, an ethical dilemma, has ended
up giving me a sense of being at home. There is, of course, some
exercise of will involved in membership, even if it is
psychologically a homecoming. First we remember that we are
members. Then, perhaps, in some way or other, we choose to be
members. Choice is, however, secondary, sequential and
consequential. Influences, as Augie March said, are at work here.
They are prior, in time and in potency, to quandaries, choices,
rules, principles, prior to deductive reasoning, or logic, or scripture,
or threat. Belonging explains reality.
There comes a point in time where Jem Finch, age 12, in rural
Alabama, in 1935, understands that his lawyer father is not, after
all, an effete and book-bound man who can no longer play softball
for the Methodists, but is the sort of person Jem is going to become.
Jem said, "Atticus is a gentleman. And so am I." Harper Lee said
her novel about Atticus was the story of a conscience. In the first
part of what follows, I propose that the community we American
lawyers will find, when we explain ourselves as belonging, is the
community Jem noticed, a community of gentlemen.
13
Robert Viscusi, the social historian, turned to his fellow Italian
Americans, at a conference of the American Italian Historical
Association, and said, with obvious emphasis: "We Italian
Americans of professional rank are in danger . . . of
respectability."
"Perhaps it is no great harm that we have taken to bringing
useless chafing-dishes instead of flexible cash as wedding presents.
But it will have been very great harm indeed if we turn and look
back at ourselves after long, active, chatty careers and can only see
• . . well-established, upwardly mobile, endlessly aspirant dullards
13. The Gentleman in Professional Ethics, 10 QUEEN's LAW JOURNAL 1
(1984).
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[who put] . . . our dignity before our conscience or our desire to be
accepted before our desire to tell the truth."
Jem Finch's gentleman's ethic would, I think, be part of what
Viscusi warned his fellow "Italian Americans of professional
rank" against, and he warned them against gentlemen for good
reason. But mostly, in warning them as he did, Viscusi pointed to
the moral aspiration in the Italian heritage, rather than to the
cultural traps laid by Protestant Americans. I propose, in the
second part of what follows, the possibility of an American lawyer's
explaining herself as belonging to one of those "communities of
memory" the late immigrants brought to America.14
Walter Brueggemann, theologian and scripture scholar, once
wrote of teaching children in the Sunday schools of the Hebraic
communities that religious formation was a matter of learning that
people of faith are separate. He said that education in the religious
tradition is "education in passion . . . nurture[d] into a distinct
community that knows itself to be at odds with dominant
assumptions . . . an insistence on being . . . chosen, summoned,
commanded, and promised." Such an education, such a belonging
and sense of belonging is "concrete and specific . . . nurture in
particularity... that produces adults who know so well who they are
and what is commanded that they value and celebrate their oddity
in the face of every seductive and powerful imperial alternative."
In the last part of what follows, I propose to consider oddity and
particularity, a legal ethic that rests in the paradox and
contradiction that is the story of Israel and of the Cross.15
14. T. Shaffer & M. Shaffer, Character & Community: Rispetto As a
Virtue in the Tradition of Italian-American Lawyers, 64 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 838 (1989).
15. The Tension Between American Law and the Religious Tradition, in
LAw AND OUR LIFE TOGETHER (R. Neuhaus ed. 1989).
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